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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
IN THE MAT·TER OF THE ESTATE
OF
GERTRUDE LOUISE
DECEASED.

l

RICHARDS,

CATHERINE R. HOWELL, CATHERINE S. CRESS and CHARLES
RICHARD SCHNEIDER,
Contestants and Respondents.

Case No.

8452

v.
JANET R. PARKER,
Proponent and Appellant,
WALKER BANK
PANY,

&

TRUST COMExecutor.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since appellant's Statement of Facts is for the most
part conclusions drawn from conflicting evidence, it does
not furnish a proper background for an understanding of
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the questions to be determined. Also this statement is inaccurate and misleading in several important particulars.
The codicil which was denied probate is dated June
25. It was signed in the Holy Cross Hospital where the
testatrix had been confined critically ill for more than a
month. She died on June 30. It was drafted by Mr. Mortensen, the assistant trust officer of the Walker Bank, without
any previous contact or consultation with the testatrix (R.
195-6). It was prepared for the purpose of correcting what
Mr. Mortensen decided upon his own motion was a mistake
made in a codicil which the testatrix had executed on June
22 (R. 180). It corrected this mistake by revoking a prior
bequest to Mrs. Howell and the children of her deceased
sister, Eleanor R. Schneider, of one-half of the residue of
the testatrix's property, and giving the entire residue to
Mrs. Janet R. Parker.
The last will of Gertrude Louise Richards was executed
over eight years prior to her death. A copy of it was kept
in her home, and the original in her safety deposit box in
the Walker Bank (R. 133). It was prepared by James A.
Stump, who had been her attorney since about 1928 (R.
363-4).
The will disposed of the bulk of the testatrix's estate
as it would have passed by the laws of succession of this
State. One-half of the residue was given to her sister, Janet
Richards Parker, and the other one-half "to my said nieces,
Catherine Richards Howell and Eleanor Richards Schneider,
only children of my deceased brother, Charles Edward
Richards." The only beneficiaries under the will who were
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not her heirs were the three sons of Mrs. Parker, and a
housekeeper who was given a small bequest. The testatrix
made certain that no one except those of the Richards blood
should receive any of her property other than the small
gift to the housekeeper.
The will appointed the testatrix's sister to be executrix,
and if she failed to act, Walker Bank & Trust Company
should be executor. Mr. Stump was one of the subscribing
witnesses.
The niece, Eleanor Richards Schneider, predeceased
the testatrix, having died in September, 1953, (R. 390). As
indicated above, the will provided that in such event, Mrs.
Schneider's children should succeed to the bequests of their
mother.
The codicil of June 25, cancels the bequest to Eleanor
Richards Schneider of the rugs, jewelry, paintings, etc.,
described in paragraph 8 of the will, giving as the reason
for this cancellation the death of Eleanor. Since the bequest
of the rugs, jewelry, etc., to Eleanor failed on account of
her death and her children were substituted for her by
paragraph 13 of the will, the cancellation of the bequest
of the property described in paragraph 8 may well be
compared to the act of kicking a corps·e.
The remaining provisions of the codicil of June 25,
revoke the bequest in the will of the residuary estate, and
give it all to Mrs. Parker, except $10,000.00 to Mrs. Howell,
and a like amount to the children of Mrs. Schneider. In
view of the fact that the bulk of the estate fell into the
residue, the codicil of June 25, would virtually disinherit
Mrs. Howell and the children of Mrs. Schneider.
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It revoked the appointment of Mrs. Parker as executrix, and affirmatively appointed Walker Bank & Trust
Company as executor. Since the will appointed the Bank
as executor if for any reason Mrs. Parker did not act, the
second appointment of the Bank by the codicil would appear
to indicate a double intention to have the Bank act.
The contested codicil is but one of three such documents
playing an important role in this contest.
The first of these was dated June 22, and was drawn
by the trust officer of the Bank. The original was destroyed
by Mr. Carlson (R. 138), and all copies of it by Mr. Athol
Rawlins and by Mr. Mortensen (R. 348 and 198). No vestige
of it remained at the time of trial (R. 138). The witnesses,
however, were positive as to its contents (R. 134). It made
two bequests, one of $10,000.00 to Mrs. Howell and a like
sum to the children of Mrs. Schneider (R. 349). It revoked
the appointment of Mrs. Parker as executrix (R. 346). It
did not revoke any of the bequests in the will (R. 136-7).
This instrument was executed in accordance with all formalities required to make a valid codicil (R. 344-5). Mr.
Clarlson and Mr. Rawlins attested the same as witnesses
(R. 138). The latter testified that he read the document
and explained its provisions to the testatrix, and that she
stated it expressed her wishes (R. 347).
According to appellant's brief, there was "some confusion" in the Bank the morning after the codicil of June
22, was executed. It is said that this confusion was brought
about by the fact that the Bank did not have the 1946 will
(Page 7). Contrary to appellant's statement, the "confu-
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sion" of which she speaks was caused by the fact that it
did have a copy of this will. Mrs. Parker brought it to the
Bank on the morning of June 23 (R. 139 and 204). When
it is considered how the codicil of June 22, cut down the
benefits awarded to Mrs. Parker by the will, and increased
the benefits awarded to Mrs. Howell and the children of
l\frs. Schneider, there is no difficulty whatever in finding
the source of the "confusion" in the Bank.
Mr. IVIortensen testified that after Iv.irs. Parker gave
him a copy of the will he immediately began to "wonder if
the codicil (of June 22) was intended to revoke any of the
provisions of the will" (R. 179).
There was not a word in the codicil of June 221 to
indicate any intention to revoke any of the provisions of
the will. Furthermore, Miss Richards never indicated to
any one at any time that she wished to cancel or revoke any
of the provisions of the will, except the appointrnent of
Mrs. Parker as executrix.
The further statement in appellant's brief to the effect
that "Mr. CarI son had been instructed by ~vi iss Richards
on June 22, 1954, to prepare a codicil for Miss Richards'
signature, giving to lVIrs. Howell only $10,000.00 and only
$10,000.00 to the children of Eleanor Schneider" is in
direct conflict with the evidence. Mr. Carlson testified that
his instruction from Miss Richards was to prepare a codicil
giving Mrs. Howell $10,000.00 and $10,000.00 to the children
of Eleanor Schneider (R. 133). The word only was never
mentioned by Miss Richards to him (R. 133). To rnake sure
that he understood her instructions, Mr. Carlson reduced
them to writing at the time (R. 134). Of course, this vv-riting
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was destroyed before the trial, but Mr. Carlson was positive
that the word only was not in it (R. 134). He was equally
positive that the testatrix never said or even intimated that
she wished to cancel or revoke any of the bequests in the
will. The codicil of June 22, was in strict accordance with
the instructions given to him (R. 137). Furthermore, as
has already been indicated, it was read and explained to
Miss Richards by Mr. Rawlins, and she indicated that it
expressed her wishes (R. 137).
The word only in connection with the bequests of
$10,000.00 to Mrs. Howell and $10,000.00 to the children of
Mrs. Schneider was the creation of Mr. Mortensen. He created it after Mrs. Parker visited the Bank on June 23, and
as a result of his "wondering if the codicil was intended to
revoke any of the provisions of the will" (R. 349). He did
not contact Miss Richards to verify her intention not to
revoke any of the provisions of the will, but sua sponte prepared a new codicil which revoked the bequests to Mrs.
Howell and the -children of Mrs. Schneider and gave virtually the entire estate to Mrs. Parker. Of course, the new
codicil threw a couple of small bones to Mrs. Howell and
the children of Mrs. Schneider, but for all practical purposes
it disinherited them.
Mr. Mortensen took his draft of the codicil to Mr.
Rawlins who had it retyped (R. 196). However, no substantive change in Mr. Mortensen's draft was made (R.
343). It undoubtedly was dated June 24, because it was
taken to the hospital on that day by Mr. Rawlins and Mr.
Carlson. When they arrived at Miss Richards' room, she
was evide·ntly in great distress (R. 140-1).
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She was moaning and crying out, "but not exactly
screaming" (R. 353). After waiting outside her room for
a considerable period, they entered and proceeded to "prepare" her for executing the new codicil (R. 141). Before
this preparation began, Mr. Carlson said to her "Miss
Richards, we made a mistake in the codicil, or we were
informed that we made a mistake in the codicil, which we
brought up here last Tuesday, and we have corrected that
with another codicil. Now, I understand that what you
want is simply to leave $10,000.00 to Mrs. Howell and
$10,000.00 to the children of Mrs. Schneider, and that Mrs.
Parker is to get the entire residue" (R. 353-4). Mr. Carlson
does not inform us as to how he discovered that "we" had
made a mistake in the codicil of June 22, but it is certain
that Miss Richards did not inform them of any mistake in
the codicil of June 22, because she was never consulted nor
contacted by anyone after the June 22, codicil had been
signed (R. 193-4).
After the crying out or screaming had subsided a little,
a table was moved over in front of the bed, and the codicil
of June 24, was placed upon it (R. 354). They tried to lift
her up so that she could sign, but they had a lot of difficulty (R. 354). Mr. Rawlins' arm got tired from holding
Miss Richards, and it was necessary to lay her back and
then raise her up again (R. 354). She continued to cry
out the words "sign, sign, sign," (R. 354). They handed her
the pen, but she failed to hold it (R. 354). Mr. Rawlins instructed Mr. Carlson to get a nurse to aid Miss Richards
(R. 355). He left the room and returned with Dr. Galligan
(R. 355). The latter appeared to ask Miss Richards some
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questions in private, after which, he nodded his head and
left the room ( R. 355) . ''We started again to see if Miss
Parker (evidently Miss Richards) couldn't execute this
will." "We finally got her up," and Mr. Rawlins put the pen
in her hand, with his hand over hers (R. 355). She had
two fingers and her thumb over the pen and Mr. Rawlins
was helping her hold it (R. 355). He instructed her two
or three times to "close your fingers" but there was no
response (R. 355). Mr. Rawlins then turned to Mr. Carlson
and remarked "Now I am to be a witness to this codicil"
and "I am not satisfied that she knows what I am telling
her and I said I can't sign this codicil as a witness" (R.
355). "That was final" as far as he was concerned (R.
356).
The next day, the codicil of June 24, was redrafted by
Mr. Jones (R. 352). It was dated June 25. With the exception of possibly some corrected errors in spelling, it was
identical to the document which the testatrix was unable
to sign the preceding day. It was taken by Mr. Jones,
Mr. Carlson, and Mr. Mortensen to the hospital for
execution by Miss Richards. When they arrived at the sick
room, Miss Richards was unconscious (R. 108). According
to their testimony, she regained consciousness and signed
the document.
The proponents of the codicil introduced no evidence
other than that of the attesting witnesses and Mr. Mortensen. Although in the pretrial proceedings they informed
the court and counsel that they would call Dr. Galligan as
a witness, they made no arrangement for his appearance
at the trial and did not call him as a witness. They
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also designated Mrs. Parker as a witness but she did not
testify.
At the conclusion of the trial, the contestants moved
the court to amend the pretrial order to embrace the issue
of whether the codicil of June 25, was procured by the
undue influence of Mrs. Janet Parker and the employees of
Walker Bank. The motion was. predicated upon the ground
that the evidence introduced without obje·ction was sufficient to raise the issue. Contestants did not request any
leave to reopen or introduce any additional evidence upon
the enlarged issue. The motion was denied.
The issue of testamentary capacity was submitted upon
special interrogatories to which no objection was made by
the proponents of the codicil. They did not request the
court to submit any further or additional issue, and the
court made no finding of any fact beyond or in addition
to the fact determined by the special verdict.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE HOSPITAL R·ECORDS WERE PROPERLY
AD~IITTED IN EVIDENCE.
POINT II.
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN ALLOWING
DR. CURRIER TO DEFINE SENILITY.
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POINT III.
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN PERMITTING DR. CURRIER TO ANSWER HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.
POINT IV.
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. CURRIER
WAS NOT UNDULY RESTRICTED.
POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING T'O
INSTRUCT THE JURY UPON THE BURDEN
OF PROOF.
POINT VI.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THE TESTATRIX WAS NOT OF SOUND AND DISPOSING MIND.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE HOSPITAL RECORDS WERE PROPERLY
ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE.
Appellant faintly contends that the hospital records
(Ex. C-3) were not admissible in evidence, because a sufficient foundation was not established. No attempt is made
to point out any particulars in which the foundation is
insufficient.
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Exhibit 3-C was properly identified as the record of
Gertrude Louise Richards during her confinement in the
Holy Cross Hospital from May 21, 1954,. until her death
on the following June 30. This record was. in the permanent
custody of the librarian of the hospital. It was prepared
in the usual course of business of the hospital. The entries
were made coincident with the event and by the attending
physicians, internes, nurses, laboratory technicians, and
other employees who participated in the examination, treatment, care, and attention of the patient. It consists of the
history given by the patient to the attending physician at
the time of admission to the hospital, the report of his
physicial examination made at that time, the laboratory
reports of blood tests, reports of the x-ray examinations,
and various other tests, the doctor's progress notes, his
orders for treatment, temperature charts, the nurses' reports of their bedside attendance, and the attending physician's final diagnosis, and cause of death. Some entries bear
no signature of the person making them, and it was impossible to determine whether all of the parties who participated in the preparation of the record were still employed
by the hospital or were available as witnesses.
Dr. Galligan, who was the attending physician in charge
of the case, certified the record as being correct. He examined it daily, and relied upon it in his treatment of the
patient. He testified at length without objection of appellant, concerning the condition of the patient during her
last illness, and used the hospital record as a means
of refreshing his recollection. Some entries were made
by him personally, and others by Dr. Copeland, an in-
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terne, acting under his direction. The interne was also
at the hospital during decedent's last illness, and testi~
fied as to her condition during this period. He relied
upon his entries in the record to refresh his recollection. No objection was made to this use of the records,
or to the testimony of the interne other than that it was
privileg.ed, which objection was expressly withdrawn.
The foregoing circumstances constitute firm foundation for admitting the hospital record_ in evidence. This
court wisely has vested in the trial judge almost unlimited
power to determine what is sufficient basis for the admission in evidence of entries such as hospital records.
"It is the prerogative of the trial court to determine when such foundation is laid and sufficient
showing of the credibility of the evidence is established." State v. Davie, . . . Utah ... , 240 P. 2d
265; G. S. Wood Mercantile Co., etc., v. Dougall, ...
Utah ... , 114 P. 2d 202.
Appellant's real contention with respect to the hospital
record is that it is not admissible in evidence under any
exception to the hearsay rule, and that an act of the legislature is necessary to authorize the use of such records as
evidence.
We submit that this court has held otherwise. It is
true that in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 96 Utah 331, 85 P. 2d 819, the ruling of the trial court
refusing to admit a hospital record in evidence was sustained. However, this ruling was upheld solely upon the
ground that a proper foundation for admission of the hospital record had not been laid. This court expressly decided
that hospital records were admissible in evidence as entries
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made in the usual course of business. That such is the
decision in the Clayton case is recognized in State v. Davie,
... Utah ... , 240 P. 2d 263. See also N orthcrest Inc. v.
vValker Bank & Trust Company, etc., ... Utah ... , 248 P.
2d 2692; Alder v. Clark, ... Utah ... , 251 P. 2d 669.
Since the Clayton case was decided, the legislature has
enacted a Public Health Code. Section 26-15-58, U. C. .P1..
1953, requires hospitals to be licensed. As a condition to
obtaining a license, the hospital must keep a clinical record
of each patient. The items of this record are specified in
detail. Ex. C-3 contains all of them.
Section 26-15-82 makes it a misdemeanor for any one
to fraudulently alter any such clinical record or knowingly
make any false entry therein.
It is submitted that hospital records are novv required
by law, and should be admissible as are other public records
of private writings..
Regardless of the present status of hospital records,
the Public Health Code places an additional guaranty upon
their reliability.
No other type of evidence has anything like the assurance of trustworthiness that hospital records possess. rrhere
could be no motive whatever for falsification by any of
the persons who make the entries, and the likelihood of
error is rather remote. This is so because as Vvigmore
points out, "they are made and relied upon in affairs of
life and death." The attending physician relies upon and
follows them religiously in his treatment of the patient.
Such strong guaranties of reliability are entirely lacking
in the case of book entries made in the regular course of
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commercial transactions which are universally admitted
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
We are aware that some commentators and text writ~
ers have cited decisions which are said to hold that hospital
records are inadmissible in evidence in the absence of statute. An examination of these cases reveals that in a great
majority of them the hospital record involved contained
entries which had no reference to the medical treatment
or history of the patient, or it contained privileged information. In some of these cases, the entries covered opinions
based solely on other opinions, and in others a proper foundation was not established. We have found no case of
modern origin in which a hospital record made in the usual
course of business, properly identified and authenticated
has been held to be inadmissible when it consisted solely
of unprivileged information pertaining to the care, treatment, and condition of the patient.
Even if we did not have the Clayton case or our Public
Health Code, there should be no hesitancy in holding that
hospital records such as Exhibit C-3 are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. As Wigmore
points out, to reject such records would be "a reproach to
the common law." See Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. VI, Section 1707.
POINT II.
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN ALLOWING
DR. CURRIER TO DEFINE SENILITY.
Point 2 of appellant's brief does not assert any error
of the trial court, nor any proposition of law which, if
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adopted by this court, would require any modification of
the judgment appealed fro1n. There is not even any discus...
sion under Point 2 of any legal principle.
Nearly eight pages of the brief are devoted to berating
and abusing Dr. Currier. About the only departure from this
abuse is a most disrespectful, if not contemptuous, remark
concerning the trial judge.
\

The spring board for this tirade against Dr. Currier
is the ruling of the trial court allowing him to define senility. Appellant distorts his definition into all sorts of vituperation. It is said to be a "vicious and unwarranted
statement not supported by the record," a "'brazen disregard of the record," a "reflection upon the integrity of Dr.
Copeland's testimony," an indelible "stamp" on Miss Richards "with the odium of mental senility by a distortion of
the observation made by Dr. Copeland."
. Appellant's counsel appear to have undergone a change
of mind, since the question under consideration was propounded in the trial court. His objection to it there was
"It is a generalized statement. It is theory. We might be
here a long time listening to this kind of discourse. The
question is not directed to anything having to do with Miss
Richards." (Page 19, Appellant's Brief.) All this is now
changed, and the question and answer are given an entirely
different import.
The objection made that the question was. not directed
to anything having to do with Miss Richards was, of course,
correct, since it called simply for the definition of a medical
term. The answer of Dr. Currier was confined strictly to
definition.
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We submit that appellant's counsel misinterpret the
testimony of Dr. Copeland with respect to senility. Dr.
Copeland did not define senility. He did find from observa-·
tion and exa.minatibn that Miss Richards was senile upon
her last admission to the hospital. He did not say that the
senility which he found upon examination did not involve
mental deterioration. On the contrary, his testimony clearly
implies that he did include mental failure in his finding
of senility. He stated, "this has a connotation of both physical and mental senility" (R. 230).
That it was proper to permit the Doctor to explain
senility, we refer to Parker v. Granger, 52 P. 2d 226, 230,
4 Calif. 2d 468.
It is almost inconceivable that appellant could have
been prejudiced, even if the answer were inadmissible.

POINT III.
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN PERMITTING DR. CURRIER TO ANS\VER HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.
Point 3 of appellant's brief contains no statement of
any legal point relied upon for a reversal of the judgment.
It consists primarily of a continuation of the slander of
Dr. Currier. This court is invited to scrutinize "substantially every answer that he gave" and stamp them as having no probative value·.
Dr. Currier's answer with respect to the effect of
decedent's heart condition upon her mental processes is
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singled out for special criticism, but no claim is made that
any error was committed in receiving it or allowing it to
stand. As a matter of record, the appellant made no objection to the question, except that of remoteness, an objection which was completely exploded by Drs. Copeland
and Galligan who testified that the decedent's heart condition became progressively worse up to the time of death.
Dr. Currier also stated that the heart condition described
in the question would not change over a per~od of one month,
meaning, of course, that it would not improve.
-

~

~

'

•

r

The assertion now made by the appellant that the
Qpinion of Dr. Currier to the effect that the heart condition described in the hypothetical question would cause a
diminution in the supply of blood to the brain and a consequent impairment of the mental process was of no probative
value because it was based upon the opinions of others
involves a misconception of the record. The condition stated
in the question was that revealed by an x-ray examination
of the decedent's heart on May 24, preceding her death.
This x-ray disclosed that the heart was grossly enlarged
with the apex almost reaching the lateral chest wall. This
condition was not a matter of opinion of anyone. On the
contrary, it was a demonstrated fact. Anyone who could
read an x-ray could see the diseased heart. Furthermore,
there was no question at all but that the decedent had suffered from a diseased heart over a period of years. Both
Dr. Copeland and Dr. Galligan so testified. It was a direct
cause of her death.
The distinction between fact and opinion is extremely
difficult to make, and as Wigmore points out has no value
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in determining what is a proper foundation for the opinion
of an expert, Volume II, Section 682-d. That distinguished
author further exposes the fallacy in the statement of some
courts that an opinion of an expert cannot be based upon
opinions expressed by other experts.
"There is no mysterious logical fatality in basing one expert opinion upon another. It is done every
day in business and in applied science." Wigmore
on Evidence, Third Edition, Volume II, Section
682-d.
Appellant also states that the hypothetical question
upon which Dr. Currier expressed his opinion that the decedent did not have sufficient mental capacity to make any
decision' of lasting or serious importance was based upon
"glaring distortions of the record." None of these so-called
glaring distortions was mentioned in the trial court. Appellant's counsel there made only the general objection that
the question was incompetent, irrelevant, and i:rnmaterial
and no proper foundation laid (R. 317). It is a complete
answer to appellant's present complaint to point out that
this objection is too general to present anything for review
by this court. In Culmer v. Clift, 14 Utah 291, 47 Pac. 85,
it is held that an objection, such as was made by appellant,
is too vague to put the court below in error.
"The objection did not point out the ground
upon which it was made, and therefore does not
merit consideration. The point of the objection
should have been particularly stated, in order to
entitle it to consideration. This is the uniform rule.
General objections to the admission of evidence are
unavailable to the party making them, either on
motion for new trial or appeal. The particular
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gr~unds of the objection must be stated, so that the

trial court may understand the nature of the objection before passing upon it," citing numerous cases~
See also Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Volume
I, Section 18.

Although appellant's objection was insufficient, we are
quite willing to meet head-on the charge that the hypothetical question is predicated upon distortions of the record.
One of the asserted "distortions" is that the hypothetical question assumes without evidence that at the time the
codicil was signed the heart had deteriorated to the point
where there was fluid in the lungs.
The record discloses that there was fluid in her lungs
practically all of the time she was in the hospital, and that
the lung fluid was due to the congestive heart failure (R.
227). There was a "back-flow" of blood resulting in an
accumulation of fluid (R. 227). This "back-flow" with
resulting fluid in the lungs, became increasingly worse up
to the moment of death. The hospital record discloses the
sound of rales at practically every examination of the testatrix. Rales are, of course, the indication of fluid in the
lungs (R. 241). The significance of it is that it directly
affects the functioning of the brain. It was, therefore, an
important element in the hypothetical question. The evidence to sustain it was abundant.
There is also an objection to the hypothetical question
upon the ground that there is no evidence that the testatrix
was unable to control bowel movements at the time the
codicil was signed, or that she was nauseated, or that she
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was vomiting, or that she was falling out of bed, or that
oxygen was being administered. The short answer to this
belated objection is that the question did not assume that
all of these events were transpiring at the very moment
the codicil was being signed. A cursory reading of the
question reveals the meaning that these conditions were
manifest at intervals during her last confinement in the
hospital.
The evidence fully justified the assumption of each
of these symptoms and conditions. For instance, on the
very morning of June 25, the hospital record discloses two
involuntary bowel movements (Ex. C-3, Page 74). Other
instances are reported in the nurse's bedside notes. (See
Ex. C-3, Pages 73, 75, 76.) This condition of the testatrix
has an important bearing upon her mental condition. There
was no pathology or physical derangement that would
explain the lack of control of the bowels. She had no control
over her bowels for the same reason that a small child does
not have such control, viz. inability to form any volition
in the matter.
The record is replete with instances of nausea and
vomiting, both before and during her stay in the hospital.
(Ex. C-3, Pages 2, 18, 19, 44, 47, 48, 53, 54.) These experiences sapped her strength and vitality, and made it
practically impossible for her to take nourishn1ent by mouth
(R .... ) . Furthermore, vomiting· is a forerunner of diabetic coma (R. 278).
There was also evidence to indicate that she fell out
of bed, and that side rails were placed on her bed to prevent
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these accidents (Ex. C-3, Pages 19 and 44). She fell out
of bed because she was delirious or disoriented.
That it was necessary to administer oxygen to her was
not only proved (Ex. C-3), but would follow from her congestive heart failure. We do not need any expert to tell us
that a deficiency of oxygen has a marked effect upon the
mental processes.
Some point is claimed that the hypothetical question
did not incorporate appellant's interpretation of the evidence with respect to the mental condition of the testatrix
on June 25. Even if these theories were within some aspect
of the evidence, respondent was at liberty to ignore them
in the question for the reason pointed out in Palmquist v.
Mine & Smelter Supply Company, 25 Utah 257, at page
263, 70 Pac. 994, and in Lindsay Land & Live Stock CO'. v.
Smart Land & Live Stock Co., 43 Utah 559, 137 Pac. 839:
"That is, the party producing the expert and
propounding the question may do so upon his own
theory of the case, and so long as he sufficiently
reflects the evidence which goes to establish his
theory, the question is not objectionable upon the
ground that all the evidence in the case is not reflected in the question."
See also Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National Building
Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099; Carter v. Standard Ace.
Ins. Co., 65 Utah 462, 238 Pac. 259; Jackson v. Harries, 65
Utah 282, 236 Pac. 234, and Johanson v. Huntsman, 60 Utah
402, 209 Pac. 197.
Appellant's complaint that the hypothetical question
injected Dr. Currier's definition of senility, and that there
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was no evidence that decedent was senile, that would in any
way reflect on her mental competency on June 25, involves
a distortion of the question. The assumption in the question
was simply "that she is senile." Dr. Copeland stated in his
report of the history of the testatrix upon her last admission to the hospital that she was senile. He testified that
he used the word senile to mean a physical condition with
a mental connotation (R. 230). In this coimection it was
found that the testatrix was afflicted "rith an advanced
stage of arteriosclerosis, or hardening of the arteries (R.
229), which was evident upon palpitation (R. 229). The
arteriosclerosis was a cause of death. It had a marked effect
upon the mental process, because it impaired the supply of
blood to the brain.
Appellant discounts the testimony of Dr. Currier, because some of his opinions were not expressed in a dogmatic manner. Certain parts of his answers are taken out
of their context and cited as rendering the opinions conjectural and speculative. The expressions "I would expect"
and "I suppose you might say" and "it would seem to me
highly unlikely" quoted on page 28 of appellant's brief
when detached from the remaining testimony and "followed
slavishly" admittedly detracts somewhat fron1 the positiveness of the· Doctor's conclusion. But as pointed out by this
court in Moore v. The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company (not yet reported) such:
"Words must be taken within the context of the
testimony in determining the meaning and value of
the evidence. * * *
"This court has long recognized that the mere
use of words such as 'belief,' 'impression,' 'proba-
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bility,' or 'possibility' will not exclude a witness's
testimony where his expression does not indicate a
lack of personal observation, but merely the degree
of positiveness of his original observation of the
facts or the degree of positiveness of his recollection." Citing Jackson v. Harries, 65 Utah 282, 236
Pac. 234; Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., et al., 52
Utah 338, 173 Pac. 900; Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070.

POINT IV.
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. CURRIER
WAS NOT UNDULY RESTRICTED.
Respondents freely confess that a wide latitude must
oe granted in the cross-examination of an expert witness,
such as Dr. Currier who had not seen or examined the testatrix; that a broad inquiry into his knowledge, training
and experience in the particular subject may be made, and
that his conclusions may be fully tested by requiring his
opinion based upon any interpretation of the evidence, or
u·pon any fact or combination of facts different from or in
addition to the state of facts assumed in the hypothetical
question. See Carter v. Insurance Company, supra.
Appellant's counsel did not see fit to test Dr. Currier's
opinion by ascertaining what it might be if predicated
upon any fact or state of facts. omitted from the hypothetical question. He contented himself with an inquiry into
the Doctor's experience. He was in no way limited in
cross-examining Dr. Currier within any of the bounds
above outlined. The sole question, which was not allowed, was one asking him to compare the weight of
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pis opinion with th~t of the testatrix's attenqing physician. We submit that the question was clearly improper
and was not designed to bring out any information which
would be of any aid whatsoever to the court or jury.

POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING T·O
INSTRUCT THE JURY UPON THE BURDEN
OF PROOF.
The issue of testamentary capacity was submitted to
the jury upon special interrogatories as follows:
"The jury is directed to place a cross opposit~
the proposition below with which it agrees based
upon the law and evidence of this case.
"PROPOSITION 1. Gertrude Louise Richards
at the time of making the codicil dated June 25, 1954,
was of sound and disposing mind.
)

(

"PROPOSITION 2. Gerturde Louise Richards
at the time of making the codicil dated June 25, 1954,
was not of sound and disposing mind.
(

X

)

"PROPOSITION 3. The evidence is so equally
divided that the jurors cannot determine either proposition 1 or proposition 2.
(

"Those jurors agreeing, please sign."
No general verdict was permitted.
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In thus submitting the issue, the court acted under
Rule 49, U. R. C. P. The pertinent provisions of this rule
are those which direct the court to give to the jury,

"* * * such explanation and instruction
concerning the matter thus submitted as may be
necessary to enable the jury to make its findings
upon each issue. If in so doing, the court omits any
issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury
of the issue so omitted, unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to
an issue omitted without such demand, the court
may make a finding, or if it fails to do so, it shall
be deemed to have made a finding in accord with
the judgment on the special verdict."
The proponents. of the codicil made no complaint that
any issue was omitted and the court made no additional
finding. The court in its instructions required the jury to
determine all questions of fact and to arrive at their decision solely from the evidence, the admissions, and stipulations of the parties during the trial. They were directed
to determine the weight or convincing force of the evidence,
also to carefully and conscientiously consider and compare
all of the testimony and all of the facts and circumstances
which might have a bearing on any issue and determine
therefrom what the facts were.
The first and second special interrogatories covered one
issue, namely, testamentary capacity. The third proposition
required them to indicate whether in their minds the evidence was such that they could not make an affirmative
finding upon either of the alternative propositions one or
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two. In the event they found the evidence equally divided on
either of the alternative issues, they were to so indicate. If
they found affirmatively that would have ended their deliberations, and the court would have rendered judgment
against the party having the burden of proof. But the
jury impliedly found that the evidence was not equally
divided. They expressly decided that the testatrix was not
of sound and disposing mind. The occasion for instructing
on the burden of proof never arose, because the jury having
weighed the evidence, found that it was not equally divided.
This case presents an excellent illustration of the effectiveness of the special verdict under Rule 49. An instruction upon the burden of proof would have confused the jury
in view of the manner in which the special interrogatories
were formed. Only such explanation and instruction concerning the matter submitted as may be necessary to enable
the jury to make its findings is permitted. A clear-cut
explanation of the law concerning the special matter was
given in this case, and no exception to it is argued in appellant's brief.
Professor ~loore in his excellent work on Federal Practice (Volume 5, Second Edition, Page 2207) says of the
federal rule, which is substantially the same as Rule 49:
"Use of the special verdict eliminates the necessity for and use of complicated instructions on the
law, which are a normal concomitant of the general
verdict. Complicated instructions have always been
ludicrous and vicious: ludicrous in that only the
naive can believe lay juries are capable of absorbing
all the legal elen1ents involved ; vicious in that lack
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of comprehension leads to confusion and ultimately,
injustice. When the special verdict is used the court
should give to the jury only such explanation and
instructions as it deems necessary to enable the jury
to make intelligent findings upon the issues of facts
submitted."
Even in cases where there is no special interrogatory
directing the jury to so indicate if they find the evidence
is evenly balanced, failure to instruct on burden of proof
is not prejudicial error if the customary instructions on
credibility of witnesses, weight of the evidence, etc., are
given, and if the evidence will support the finding made
by the jury.
A typical case is Howard v. Britton, 71 Tex. 286, 9 S.
W. 73, where it was said:
"The legal evidence adduced fully authorized
the finding in favor of the plaintiffs, and we cannot see how a charge on the burden of proof would
have in any way enlightened the jury as to the
issues before them in this case, which is the only
purpose of a charge."
A similar result was reached in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v.
Thorp, 125 Tex. 373, 83 S. W. 2d 658, in which the court
commented:
"The court gave the usual charge to the effect
that the jury were the sole judges of the credibility
of the witnesses, and the weight to be given their
testimony, etc. Under these circumstances it is
doubtful whether a charge on the burden of proof,
in connection with the submission of the issue was
necessary.''
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There is another sufficient reason why the court did
not err in granting appellant's request for instruction ·on
the burden of proof. Her counsel waived any right to complain of such omission.
Near the conclusion of the trial, the court called upon
counsel for the parties to state their respective positions
on the question of burden of proof. Contestants' counsel
admitted that the burden of proof "is on me" (R. 423).
Proponents' counsel, however, refused to concede that such
burden was on the contestants. When asked by the trial
judge to agree, he made the following stuttering answer:
"THE COURT: And by your requested Instruction No. 11 you are of that opinion too apparently.
"MR. GUSTIN: That is the burden of going
forward.
"THE COURT: Well, that is not what you say
in your request No. 11, so I take it that I am in a
minority and you gentlemen are agreed.
"MR. GUSTIN: Well, we adhere to our requested Instruction No. 11.
"THE COURT: Then with that being true, I
would say that Mr. Bagley has the right to open and
close the argument, since that is the only issue I am
going to submit to the jury.
"MR. GUSTIN: And might the record show
our objection and our exception, '\Ve claiming nevertheless the right to open and close on the argument.
"THE COURT: All right, it may show that,
and it may also show that if you gentlemen are
right in the law, that I have been deceived as to the
true status of the law and will fall into this error
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at your instance and request, and I don't think you
can take any advantage of me on that ground.
"MR. GUSTIN: WeH, I appreciate the dilemma,
and I can assure the court that it is not with any
deliberate purpose of deceiving the court.
"THE COURT: I am sure not. It's all right
if you can anyway. I learn by being deceived" (R.
423-4).
It is clear that the proponent's counsel was primarily
concerned with the right to open and close the argument
to the jury. Being an experienced lawyer, he knew an
instruction on the burden of proof meant nothing as a
practical matter. It was the right to open and close
the argument that was the vital matter to him. That right
went to the party who had the burden of proof. Proponent's
counsel had to make a clear-cut choice. He did not do so.
Instead, he tried to ride with the hounds and hide with
the hare.
We submit that the jury was properly instructed as
contemplated by Rule 49, and that the appellant is in no
position to put the trial court in error in failing to
instruct on the burden of proof.
POINT VI.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THE TESTATRIX WAS NOT OF SOUND AND DISPOSING MIND.
Since this is an action at law, the jury's verdict must
be upheld, unless it is unreasonable in view of all of the
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evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom when
considered in the light most favorable to supporting the
verdict. Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, Executor of the Estate of Wilda Gail Swan, Deceased, (not yet
reported); In re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256;
In re McCoy's Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P. 2d 620.
This court has several times declared that a person
does not have the necessary mental capacity to make a valid
will, if at the time he is unable to remember who are the
natural objects of his bounty, recall to mind the character
and extent of his property, form some understandable plan
for the disposition of his property, and keep such plan in
mind long enough to execute it unaided and without suggestion from others. In re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170
Pac. 452; In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 P. 2d
1103; In re Butters' Estate, ... Utah ... , 261 P. 2d 171;
Hendee v. Walker Bank, etc., supra.
The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with
this definition of testamentary capacity, and no objection
or exception thereto has been made. The ultimate question
of fact to be determined in this case may, therefore, be
stated as follows : Did the testatrix possess a mind that
retained full know ledge of the property she possessed and
an intelligent understanding of the disposition she desired
to make of it, and the persons that she desired to have it,
with capacity to recollect and comprehend the nature of the
claims of those excluded from participating in her bounty,
a mind capable of exercising judgment, reason and deliberation, and of weighing the consequences of her codicil
to a reasonable degree, and the effect of it upon her prop-
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erty and near relatives and of forming and executing a plan
of disposition without suggestion from others.
No other question is as difficult to prove as the condition of the human mind at a particular time and circumstance. There is no problem in determining the testarnentary capacity of a person in vigorous health and full possession of his faculties nor the lack of such capacity of an
insane person. Between these two extremes, a conclusion of
competency or incompetency can never be drawn with absolute certainty. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of
Iowa in Re Allison's Estate, 105 Iowa 130, 73 N. W. 489:
"The conclusion depends much on the credit to
be given to particular witnesses, not so much with
reference to their veracity as with reference to their
conclusions from observations and particular facts
coming to their knowledge. The line between competency, and incompetency, or that shows a testamentary capacity, is always traced with uncertainty,
and the findings in most cases are justified only
as the best solution of a doubtful problem * * *
However the facts might be found, there would be
the conviction that it was doubtful. It is not to be
properly said that the evidence is conclusive either
way. With such conditions the finding of the jury
should stand, and especially after the district court
has declined to interfere."
The evidence in this case fully sustains the determination of the jury that the testatrix was not competent to
make a valid codicil at the time the rejected instrument is
alleged to have been signed by her.
She entered the hospital for the last time on May 23,
1954, "acutely ill" (Ex. C-3, Page 3). She was suffering
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from diabetes of some nine years duration, chronic congestive heart failure, and arteriosclerosis. Her diabetic.
condition "was very severe" and proved to be "very difficult to control" (R. 227). She "fluctuated from an extreme
of diabetic coma on the one extreme to that of insulin shock
on the other extreme, and she was very difficult to maintain in a balanced condition" (R. 227-8). The efforts of
the doctors to maintain a balance were described as a "day
to day battle," which they never won (R. 277). There
were so many episodes of diabetic coma and insulin shock
that it was virtually impossible to say when one began and
the other ended (R. 278-9). The condition continued to
deteriorate up to the time of death, with a definite downhill course following the "very stormy night" of June 21.
On June 25, she was "more stuporous than before." She
continued to fluctuate between diabetic acidosis and insulin
shock, even though "continuous attention is paid to her
urinary sugar and blood sugar" (Ex. C-3).
This extremely severe diabetic condition ''"'"as aggravated and complicated by the congestive heart failure, which
was of long duration and so serious as to cause almost
continuous. fluid in the lungs (R. 227). The heart was
"grossly enlarged with the apex almost reaching to the
lateral chest wall" (Ex. C-3). It appears that her doctors
prescribed digitalis in an effort to relieve the heart failure.
From this treatment there followed a very debilitating case
of vomiting, vvhich greatly weakened her (R. 278). It was
impossible for her to take food by mouth (R. 278). The
failure of the heart made it necessary to give her oxygen
(R .... ) , and caused considerable swelling of her extremi~
ties. It was a direct cause of her death.
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The congestive heart failure had a direct bearing up?n
her mental functioning, because the diseased heart could
not pump a sufficient supply of blood to the brain ( R.
238-9). It was impossible for the doctors to relieve the
heart condition, because she suffered from a severe deficiency of mineral in her system. "We could not correct this
deficiency without disturbing the heart too much, so we
corrected it to the point of danger, and then we had to stop"
(R. 236). This mineral deficiency also directly impaired
her mental processes, (R. 236) and was at a particularly
low ebb on the day the contested codicil was signed (R.
236).
Another factor which seriously and directly impaired
the testatrix's mental processes was the arteriosclerosis or
hardening of the arteries ( R. 229) . This process was of
long standing (R. 229). The arteries affected were those
leading to the heart (R. 270). This disease is also given
as one of the causes of death (Ex. C-3, Page 1) .
None of the afflictions above described improved during the patient's stay in the hospital. On the contrary, all
of them grew progressively worse (R. 272). The day on
which the codicil of June 25, was signed, was a particularly
bad day for the testatrix. She was more stuporous than she
had been previously. There was fluid in her I ungs, which
itself produces a semi-comatose condition (R. 242). On the
morning of this day, she experienced two involuntary bowel
movements, indicating a complete loss. of volition (Ex. C-3).
There is ample evidence to establish that the testatrix
was in a state of coma when the subscribing witnesses and
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Mr. Mortensen arrived at the hospital on June 25, and also
to prove that she did not revive thereafter to the extent of
being able to form or carry out any understandable plan
for the disposition of her property. Admittedly, she was
unconscious and no one could say that it was not a diabetic
coma (R. 108).
The so-called intravenous "feeding" given the testatrix
soon after the gentlemen just mentioned arrived at the
hospital is an extremely significant item of evidence. The
"feeding" consisted of an injection of dextrose and potassium chloride (R. 260).
It is well known that dextrose is administered to a
diabetic to bring the patient out of diabetic coma. There
is danger that the afflicted person will die if something
is not done to restore consciousness (R. 27 4) . Potassium
chloride is also administered to a patient in a stupor or a
semi-comitose condition caused by an insufficiency of mineral in the system. According to Dr. Copeland, the sole
purpose of the intravenous feeding of dextrose and potassi urn chloride was to bring 1\liss Richards out of a coma
or semi-comitose condition.
What was the purpose of that?
"A. The purpose was that we thought some
of her stuperousness was the result of a potassium
deficiency. We had done blood levels in the laboratory of the potassium in her blood. We found the
potassi urn level to be significantly decreased, and
we thought in talking this over among ourselves or
the physicians, that this was a likely cause of her
mental condition. We decided to replace some of her
deficiency" (R. 261).
"Q.
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Convincing evidence of the testatrix's lack of testamentary capacity is that which relates to the attempt of
Mr. Rawlins a·nd Mr. Carlson to have her execute the codicil
of June 24. On that day she was utterly incapable of exerting any pressure whatever upon the pen that had been
placed in her hand by Mr. Rawlins. Although he held her
fingers on the pen, she did not have the strength to hold
it. There was no mental response whatever to his instruction to hold the pen. Her mind was concerned primarily
with her funeral. Her mumbling the words "sign, sign,
sign" indicate a semi-conscious realization of a compelling
necessity to execute the document. It was obvious to Mr.
Rawlins that she lacked capacity to dispose of her property
by will, and he declined to assume the role of an attesting
witness.
There is no evidence whatever that she rallied from the
afflictions which were so desperate on June 24. She did
not gather any strength of either body or mind during the
interval between the visit of Mr. Rawlins and that of Mr.
Jones. On the contrary, she continued to lose ground steadily.

The only possible explanation of the testimony of the
attesting witnesses that she signed the rejected codicil
without her hand being guided is that the injection of the
dextrose and potassium chloride put some fleeting artificial
strength in her hand.
The events immediately preceding the signing of the
June 25, codicil reveal most distinctly the lack of testamentary capacity. The June 22, codicil, which was destroyed, is
itself evidence of her incompetency at that time. It was a
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most unnatural and confusing instrument. Other than
appointing the Bank as executor, it contained no provision
modifying or changing any of the provisions of the will.
Still this instrument (according to the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses) exactly expressed her wishes. Within
the space of three days, another codicil is presented to her
for her signature. Although its provisions differed violently
from those of the codicil of June 22, she again (according
to the testimony of the subscribing witnesses) indicates
that it expressed her wishes exactly.
Another striking item of evidence indicating the complete deterioration of the testatrix's mental functions is
the opening remark made by her to Mr. Carlson upon his
first visit to the hospital. She is alleged to have stated that
she had made "a great mistake in her will," and wanted to
correct it. This obviously is the voice of an enfeebled intellect. No rational mind would entertain such an idea.
It is conceivable, of course, that if she had been mentally
competent, she could have changed her mind concerning the
disposition of her property, but it is difficult to conceive
how she could have reached the conclusion that she had
made a terrible mistake in her will. What mistake, terrible
or other kind, could she find in a will which made a most
fair and equitable distribution of her property among those
who were nearest in blood to her? How did she propose
to correct it? According to the codicil which she signed the
next day, the only correction made in the 'viii was the taking of $20,000.00 from her sister and giving it to Mrs.
Howell and the children of Mrs. Schneider.
Of course, persons other than the testatrix may have
concluded that she had made a terrible mistake in the will
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of 1946. Mrs. Parker expressed this thought in slightly
different words to Mr. Mortensen when she urged him to
contact her sister and have something done about it.
In these circumstances, it is evident that even on June
21, Miss Richards' mind had become so weakened that it
could be bent in any direction.
The codicil which was denied probate may properly be
designated as a death-bed will. The following is a quotation
from In re Costos' Will, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 306:
"This instrument was a death bed will, made
by a sick, suffering man. In an earl;v case, Kingstey
v. Blanchard, 66 Barb. 317, 325, the Court said: 'The
death-bed is not the place for closing up the affairs
of this life. The mind enfeebled by disease-disturbed by the grief of friends, by its care for those
who must be left behind-agitated by the hopes and
fears of the unknown and untried life beyond the
grave-is not in a condition to weigh accurately the
claims of children and friends on its bounty-to cast
off the influence which kindness, or force or fear
may have brought it under.' "

~

Appellant's contention with respect to the sufficiency
;: of the evidence to support the verdict is predicated upon the
{ proposition that the opinion of Dr. C'urrier must be disrer garded. Instead of attempting to offer some plausible reafi son why the opinion should be rejected, appellant merely
~· reiterates the slander and abuse of Dr. Currier that appears
tJ\ under Points 3 and 4 of the brief.
This Doctor is eminently well trained in the field of mental and nervous dis2r: eases, and is an instructor of psychiatry at our State Uniw· versity (R. 306-7). His opinion was predicated upon a state
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of facts fully supported by the evidence. It is difficult to
conceive how his conclusions could have been different from
what they were. Appellant's counsel made no attempt to
impair his opinion by cross-examination or by offering any
contrary conclusion of a medical witness.
Appellant intimates that Dr. Galligan expressed the
opinion that the testatrix was of sound mind when the codicil was signed. This is an incorrect appraisal of his testimony. He expressly disqualified himself from rendering
any such opinion (R. 285). Furthermore, his understanding of what constitutes testamentary capacity was at variance with the definitions of this court (R. 284).
Appellant attempts to make something out of the statements that the symptoms of diabetic coma and insulin shock
are so dramatic that they would be evident to anyone. The
difficulty of attaching any significance to these statements
is that Dr. Galligan who made them was referring to the
ordinary diabetic. He certainly was not referring to a
bedridden dying woman who did not have the strength to
hold a pen, or to a person who had so many episodes of
diabetic coma and insulin shock that it was impossible to
determine when one ended and the other began.
Appellant argues that the opinions of the "highly competent and indisputably honorable men" who attested the
disputed document should be accepted as final. The same
argument was addressed to the jury. This was proper, because the jury has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. The opinion of Mr. Jones was
predicated upon such a slight acquaintance with the testatrix that it was virtually without probative value. He had
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never seen Miss Richards or talked to her prior to his visit
to the hospital on June 25. He did not make any inquiry
whatsoever concerning her mental condition, although he
knew of her desperate illness and undoubtedly of Mr.
Rawlins' experience on June 24. He did not contact her
doctor, the nurses, the internes, or anyone else who would
know whether or not she could make an intelligent disposi. tion of her property. He did not attempt to have Miss
~ Richards express her wishes in her own words. He pro. ceeded rather to instruct her as to his understanding of her
. wishes and to cross examine her to obtain her assent to the
terms of the document which had been drafted without her
; knowledge and without consultation with her. It is not
. necessary to go so far as to say that the jury would have
been warranted in finding that Mr. Jones did not actually
~entertain the opinion which he expressed. It is sufficient
. to point out that the jury was not bound to accept his opin. ion. It must be remembered that Mr. Jones was acting as
:. the attorney for the Walker Bank-not for Miss Richards
~ -and that both he and the Bank stood to obtain a very sub);
. stantial financial benefit if the codicil were sustained.
i

The opinion of Mr. Carlson rests upon an even weaker
·~foundation that that of Mr. Jones. Three days previously
::he realized that the testatrix's condition was so precarious
·~
~~that she might pass away at any time. He accompanied
Mr. Rawlins to the hospital on June 24, and observed the
'F
~~unsuccessful attempt of the testatrix to hold a pen. He saw
~.her complete inability to perform any mental function or
~·physical act. He heard Mr. Rawlins refuse to attest to her
l~ capacity to make a will. How could he under these circum-

•

1
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stances believe that the testatrix was competent to make
a will the next day when her condition had further deter.
iorated?
The testimony of a subscribing witness must stand or
fall upon the same basis as that of any other witness:
"The subscribing witnesses to a will are not to
be regarded as more or less truthful than other
witnesses because they are subscribing witnesses.
Valentine v. Second Baptist Church, 293 Ill. 71, 127
N. E. 178. The testimony of such witnesses may be
overcome by any competent evidence, and other evi..
dence, circumstantial as well as direct, may tend as
effectually to impeach and discredit the evidence of
attesting witnesses as would the formal presentation
of witnesses who would avow that the attesting witnesses had bad reputations for truth and veracity."
Oliver v. Oliver, 340 Ill. 445, 172 N. E. 917, 923.
Appellant seems to adopt the theory that the contested
codicil was executed during a lucid interval, and that evidence of the testatrix's incompetency before and after the
moment of signing the contested codicil is not sufficient to
overcome the testimony of the subscribing witnesses. A
similar theory was advanced by the proponents of the will
in Miller's Estate, 60 P. 2d 498, ... Cal. App.... , where
the factual situation is strikingly similar to that in the
present case. The court disposed of it in the following language:
"In the case at bar it is the contention of appellant that the will was drawn during a lucid in·
terval. However, the court found differently, and,
while this testimony raised a conflict, the evidence
of the respondents justified the finding of the lower
court.
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"It is true that neither physical or mental weakness will necessarily invalidate a will. They are,
however circumstances to be considered together
with all other facts surrounding the execution of
the will in determining testatrix's testamentary capacity. In re Estate of Alexander, 111 Cal. App. 1,
295 P. 53.
"Proof of the sanity of the testator and of the
facts upon which his state of mind depends are not
necessarily confined to the exact time of the execution of the will. Evidence of the testator's mental
status, together with his appearance, conduct, acts,
habits, and conversation, both before and after the
execution of the will, are admissible so long as they
have a reasonable tendency to indicate his mental
condition at the time of the execution of the will.
In re Estate of Alexander, supra; In re Estate of
Baker, 176 Cal. 430, 168 P. 881."

The cases cited in appellant's brief announce correct
,
- principles of the law with respect to capacity to make a
~ valid will. However, none of those cases contain facts com~ parable to those in the present ·case, and cannot, therefore,
,. be regarded as precedents. Admittedly, old age, eccentrici~· ties, and physical infirmity do not alone render a person
·incapable of making a valid will. But here we have all of
' these debilities plus a complication of severe and incurable
:t. diseases which have all but completely destroyed the tes~ tatrix' s mind and body.

The only Utah case in which the facts are at all similar
:~is In re McCoy's Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P. 2d 620. Here
:~:was involved a death-bed will which the trial court found
i~to be invalid because of lack of testamentary capacity. The
W'will was signed on December 25, and the testatrix died five
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days later. She was ninety-two years of age, and on December 25, was very sick, and in a greatly weakened condition.
She was in pain and was awake only at intervals. When
food was placed in her mouth, she did not react in any
manner. Prior to her last illness, she apparently had been
active and in full possesion of her faculties, except as they
may have been normally affected by advancing age. This
court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the
finding of the trial court that Mrs. McCoy was incompetent
at the time the will was signed.

In re Albertson's Estate, ... Calif. 2d ... , 87 P. 2d
883, the testatrix was seventy years of age when the will
in question was drawn. She died eleven days later. She
suffered from arteriosclerosis, and enlargement of the
heart, and other diseases. The arteriosclerosis and the diseased heart had produced the same effect upon her mental
processes as were manifest in Miss Richards' case. The
court held there was sufficient evidence to support the
finding of the trial court of a lack of testamentary capacity.
In McCartney v. Holmquist, 106 F. 2d 855, the codicil
in question was signed on August 26, and the testatrix died
the following December 9. For a period of several weeks
prior to the execution of the codicil, she had been extremely
ill, suffering from arteriosclerosis, enlargement of the
heart, and other diseases. It appeared that she suffered considerable pain and was extremely weak. Her conversation
was muddled and rambling. The late Judge Stephens approved for the court the action of the trial judge rejecting
the codicil upon the ground of incon1petency.
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The evidence in the case at bar of a lack of testamentary capacity is much stronger than that offered in any
of the cases cited herein or in the appellant's brief. The
diseases with which the testatrix was afflicted were such
as to directly injure the brain and impair her mental faculties. The uncontrollable diabetes produced a state of coma.
· When given insulin to counteract the excessive sugar in the
· blood, it produced shock, the end result of which was also
: coma. She fluctuated between these two types of coma.
The lucid intervals between them became rarer and shorter
: until they virtually disappeared during the last ten days
. of her life.
The congestive heart failure with its consequent back: flow of blood caused the accumulation of fluid in the lungs,
: which in turn produced a condition of stupor. Because of
~ the inability of the diseased heart to pump the necessary
:. volume of blood, the brain cells suffered from a lack of
r oxygen.
~

The ravages of these diseases reduced the testatrix to
a mental state below that required to make a valid will.

The verdict of the jury is fully sustained by the evi. dence and should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT H. BAGLEY,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
WILLIAM S. WHITE,
WHITE, KLUTE & WHITE,

Attorneys for Respondents.
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